This paper examines a critical phase in the life-span of a technological innovation: the transfer of a new medical technology from developers to users. This transitional or transformational phase of the innovation is critical, for instance, when the use of a product is not yet institutionalized in the target communities. Such phases, typically presupposing collaborative performance between otherwise loosely connected actors and activity systems, emerge especially in the early phases of implementation and diffusion prior to the stabilization and expansion of user networks. These transitional processes between design and implementation are critical and constitutive to entry on diffusion path and market creation (Green, 1992) .
and the company. … Unlike previous work, co-configuration never results in a 'finished' product. Instead, a living, growing network develops between customer, product, and company …With co-configuration, we can imagine creating products that are not only made to order for you, but continuously remake themselves as your needs change." (Victor & Boynton, 1998, p. 195-196) Victor and Boynton (1998, p. 197) point out that the two industries where co-configuration and customer-intelligent products are beginning to define the competition are medical devices and computer software systems. Not surprisingly, the former are typically highly dependent on the latter built-into the products. The device on which we focus in this paper is a prominent example of this new generation of products.
Economics of innovation, by focusing typically on cross-sectional studies and mature innovations, implicitly presupposes unproblematic interaction and learning processes between producers and advanced users in the home market (Lundvall, 1992; Fagerberg, 1992; Lissoni & Metcalfe, 1994) . Although research on the management of innovation has stressed the importance of interactive learning processes in implementation (Shaw, 1985; Fleck, 1994) , these studies have not analyzed actual interactions within specific contexts. Studies have mainly focused on a company's internal processes and assumed shared values and interests of all parties involved (e.g., Burgelman & Maidique, 1988; Rothwell, 1994) . According to actornetwork theorists (e.g., Latour, 1987) , on the other hand, an artifact and a network of actors are co-constructed in the innovation process within a specific historical time span. Although these studies have focused on the different and conflicting interests of the actors involved, they have not analyzed in detail the dynamics of the interaction.
This implies that the mainstream innovation and technology studies have been "insensitive to the ways new technologies may actually alter the organizational and occupational structure of (…) work", as shown by Stephen Barley (1986, p. 78) . In his qualitative case study of the implementation of CT scanner Barley shows, how new medical imaging devices challenge traditional role relations among radiologists and radiological technologists. He found that the scanners' technical complexity and the radiologists' lack of familiarity with CT's diagnostic signs threatened the inexperienced radiologists' authority and forced them to rely more heavily on the technologists (Barley, 1986 p. 106) . By studying two different hospital settings using the same technology, Barley was able to show that technical uncertainty and complexity are social constructions that vary from setting to setting even when identical technologies are deployed (Barley, 1986 p. 106 ).
Yet, little is known about how the collaborative relations between developers and users are constructed historically and situationally. Except for Barley's study on radiological work, there has been little -if any -qualitative research on systemic tensions and constraints constitutive to work practices in the actual situations and contexts of implementation. There is a lack of studies focusing on situations where producers and users meet.
Barley's results deserve attention also because they point out a significant managerial challenge in the implementation of new technologies and products. Reconstructing of organizational roles and collaborative relations should be seen as a central issue in the implementation, constraining or enhancing the anticipated outcome of the critical phase. We suggest that innovation studies should gain theoretical and methodological sensitivity to the tensions and constraints occurring in the collaborative relations between parties of the implementation process.
Activity theory as framework
To better understand and -hopefully -also manage the critical phase of the innovation process, we suggest an activity theoretical perspective. Cultural-historical activity theory (Leont'ev, 1978; Engeström, 1987; Cole & Engeström, 1993; Engeström, Miettinen & Punamäki, 1998 ) takes a collective object-oriented activity system as its prime unit of analysis. For activity theory, contexts are activity systems. An activity system integrates the subject, the object and the instruments (material tools as well as signs and symbols) into a unified whole. Activity is driven by a collective object and motive, but it is realized in goaloriented individual and group actions.
A model of the basic structure of an activity system (Engeström, 1987 (Engeström, , 1990 (Engeström, , 1999 ) is presented in Figure 1 . In the model, the subject refers to the individual or sub-group whose agency is chosen as the point of view in the analysis. The object refers to the 'raw material' or 'problem space' at which the activity is directed and which is molded or transformed into outcomes with the help of physical and symbolic, external and internal tools (mediating instruments and signs). The community comprises multiple individuals and groups who share the same general object. The division of labor refers to both the horizontal division of tasks between the members of the community and the vertical division of power and status. Finally, the rules refer to the explicit and implicit regulations, norms and conventions that constrain actions and interactions within the activity system. Figure 1 . The mediational structure of an activity system (Engeström, 1987, p. 78) Activity theory offers a framework to study technology development and use in terms of object-oriented and historically constructed activity. In order to understand an innovation process, the researcher should analyze the history and developmental phases of the innovative activity. The current phase of the innovation process and its developmental challenges are historically constructed. Ethnographic observation should be informed by historical data and analysis.
Activity theory is based on the notion of object-relatedness of human activity. It is relatively easy to envision the objects of basic material activities such as manual labor. However, a closer look at such an activity as scientific research or product design, reveals the slippery and multifaceted character of its objects. Yet it is clear that those actitivies are oriented toward something and driven by something larger and more durable than just the specific goals of particular actions and individuals. This something -the object -is constantly in transition and under construction, and it manifests itself in different forms for different participants and at different moments of the activity (Engeström, 1990; Engeström & Escalante, 1996 pp. 360-364) .
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There is nothing in the material makeup of an artifact as such that would determine which one it is: object or tool. The constellation of the activity at any given moment determines the place and meaning of the artifact. In the innovation process, the product constructed by the designers, typically engineers and programmers, will be handed to users and consumers who will apply it to their life worlds and work practices. Within the critical phase discussed in the paper, the place and meaning of the technology turns -or needs to be turned -from the object of the designer into a viable tool of the user. However, what is meant to function as a tool is easily turned into an object: an instrument becomes an overwhelming problem and thus an end in itself.
Why is it, in the first place, that the producers seem to be unable to identify user problems and needs even if the information is on their desks? Is it because the producers are unable to make this critical shift between object and tool? We argue that the ability of the developers and users to discriminate between tool and object and to play with their relationship is a vital feature of an innovation network capable of re-mediation, learning, and qualitative change.
We suggest this issue is a core challenge for innovation management and a crucial condition for the capability for customer oriented redesign of artifacts.
Tensions and conflicts, more or less visible in a setting, are historically formed. The tensions and conflicts inherent in the setting may be seen as manifestations of systemic contradictions within and between activity systems that partake in the innovation process. Activity theory regards contradictions as moving forces of change and development in the innovation process.
Contradictions manifest themselves in disturbances and breakdowns in work processesas well in workers innovative attempts to solve them. The notion of breakdown has been used to refer to a disruption in the normal functioning of things forcing the individual to adopt a more reflective or deliberative stance toward ongoing activity (Koschmann, Kuutti & Hickman, 1998) . Analyses of work (Engeström 1996; Norros, 1996) have shown how various disturbances, everyday troubles and breakdowns in work processes highlight the systemic contradictions. Standard work actions are defined as procedural steps that follow the script of a disturbance-free 'normal' process. Disturbances are analyzed as deviations from this scripted procedure.
To understand the contradictions at play in the critical phase of the innovation process, we should trace recurring everyday troubles and disturbances appearing in concrete use situations of the technology. These interactive situations can be recorded and selectively used also as intervention material, as a 'mirror' to enhance reflection and dialogue among the parties involved (Engeström, 1999) . Discoordinations and breakdowns often lead to re-mediation of the performance and perspectives, sometimes even to re-mediation of the overall activity system in order to resolve its pressing inner contradictions.
The innovation process is comprised of multiple actors, each having a distinct perspective on the developing technology. From an activity-theoretical perspective, the early implementation of new technology is a concise example, a laboratory, to examine the multitude of historical layers, perspectives and viewpoints in and around the developing activity and artifact. In the transfer of the technology from developers to users, separate historical layers and perspectives meet and interact. Such an encounter is realized through different perspectives that the parties construct in discourse. The notion of perspective is closely related to the theoretically more demanding Bakhtinian concepts of voice and social language (R. Engeström, 1995; Wertsch, 1991) . Holland and Reeves (1994) characterize perspectives as contingent and historical, situationally emergent collective productions.
"'Perspective' is a further elaboration of concepts that link activity systems to one another and to structures and dynamics of power and privilege. It allows one to speak more directly to agency in Marx's work, to the capacity of humans to apprehend the conditions of their activity and through their praxis to change those very conditions. … 'perspective' potentially names a place where systemic contradictions become manifest in persons." (Holland & Reeves, 1994, p. 19) In the following sections, we will apply these theoretical concepts in the analysis of four snapshots from the critical phase of an actual innovation. The innovation in question is a neuromagnetical measuring system (MEG). First, we will present a brief historical description of the case under scrutiny and formulate a hypothesis of the central contradictions of the activity systems involved in the critical phase of the innovation. After that, we will analyze a specific sequence of interaction, a failed patient measurement and the ensuing conversations between the developers and users of the device. The event represents a window into the critical phase of the innovation. We will analyze this interactive sequence from the points of view of disturbances, multiple perspectives and re-mediation and, finally, object and tool.
History and contradictions of the neuromagnetometer device
The neuromagnetometer and its use in studying brain are called magnetoencephalography (MEG). It is a technological innovation based on biomagnetism, low temperature physics and superconductivity. The three activity systems centrally involved in MEG are (1) physicists of the laboratory were pioneers in instrument building and measurement of biomagnetism (that is, magnetic fields of human tissue, e.g, eye, heart and the brain).
Measuring the weak magnetic fields of the brain turned out to be a great challenge for instrumentation. Expertise in creating and measuring ultimate low temperatures, the prerequisite for measuring the weak electromagnetic activity of the brain, was at the core of the Low Temperature Laboratory. The laboratory was among the very first groups starting to develop MEG in the early 1980s. The enterprise was considered to be risky. Some of the leading figures in the field found the work with MEG an impossible task and quit
The laboratory not only took a huge technological challenge but also a big step to a new discipline, brain research. For low temperature physicists working in a technical university, human brain was an untypical and unfamiliar research object. In order to bridge the gap between instrumentation expertise and the measurement object, the human brain, a young clinical neurophysiologist and medical doctor was hired already in the early 1980s to develop and apply the MEG for basic neurophysiological research. The brain research group was founded in the laboratory. During the 1980s, the physicists and the neurophysiologists worked closely together developing both the instruments and the methods for analyzing and modelling the MEG data. The neurophysiologists contributed mainly to method and software development by using the device in their research work. In a sense, the instrument builders, the modellers and the brain researchers of the group formed a singular unit, a team, having a shared object of activity: the technology and methods for neurophysiological research.
The brain researchers, with the help of the physicists, learned to understand the functioning of the technology and operate on the measurement system as well. They became highly qualified advanced users of MEG (von Hippel, 1988) . For the most part, healthy adults served as measurement subjects for basic neurophysiological research. Fellow researchers were often used as subjects, and they usually had no physiological obstacles in sitting under the machine.
The measurement room was located near the offices of the physicists, so that the researcher operating the system was able to ask for and get help very quickly if any problems emerged.
Encouraged by the successful technological and software development and application of the device in basic brain research, a spin-off company Brainview was established in 1989 in order to utilize the commercial potential of the innovation and build the first MEG instrument in the world covering the whole head. The main instrument developers and software designers of the brain research group joined the firm which was funded and owned by governmental funding agencies and capital investors. During its first years, the firm was located at the Low Temperature Laboratory. The enterprise proved successful as the prototype version of the first whole-head neuromagnetometer was built by the company in the early 1990s. Later, when the firm moved out from the lab, the software designers of the company stayed at the lab and split their time between the brain research group and the company. This arrangement was made in the interest of maintaining the relation between instrument development and experimental research.
At first, the main market for the device was basic research, namely brain research groups all over the world. However, there were not many of them left after the first wave of commercial installations during 1994-1996. Competitors emerged, too. Already in the early 1990s, the company and its owners regarded this market as too limited for maintaining the production of the MEG devices in the long run. The company was facing the necessity of acquiring clinical markets for the device in the near future. They also anticipated rapid growth of the clinical market. This seemed evident since the clinical utility of MEG had already been demonstrated, for instance, in pre-surgical localization of functionally irretrievable areas, such as motor cortex, and in localization of epileptic foci. However, standardization of MEG for routine diagnostic methods at hospitals was yet to come.
In the mid 1990s, a local user network emerged, as the MEG device was installed at the In spite of the hospital setting the model of using MEG in basic research was reflected in the ways the measurements were organized and conducted in the laboratory. Most of the users were doctoral students collecting data for their dissertations. With the exception of one nurse, there was no permanent staff for the maintenance of the device or for the measurement services. Each researcher or group was supposed to perform and operate their own measurements. MEG was still used predominantly as a scientific instrument in the BioMag laboratory.
Interviews conducted with parties of the local network revealed different, even conflicting conceptions of 'clinical use' and 'what was going on' in the BioMag Laboratory. As one of the founding members of the BioMag Laboratory saw it, BioMag was functioning as a "centralized research facility on a temporal basis, with several groups entering the lab, performing their experiments and leaving the facility." According to the laboratory manager, "we are getting on in our clinical work, we do have a few clinical research projects in the BioMag that measure patients". The head of the brain research group of LTL stated that "there exist no clinical services at BioMag" and "measuring patients with MEG does not make it 'clinical'." The president of the company admitted that they were somewhat unfamiliar with the various groups using MEG at BioMag and added that "we do not exactly know how to get involved with clinical users at the hospital."
The evolution of the technology and the firm in the Low Temperature Laboratory was based on close collaboration between technology developers and brain researchers who became also involved in the development of the technology. To a certain extend, these groups had a shared object of activity, the development of the technology and research methods. After the turn to commercialization of the technology, the situation has been changing. We expect that the developers will have difficulties to understand the different context and object of the potential clinical users working with real patients. The developers may have problems in considering the clinicians not only as users of a specific technology but more broadly as practitioners for whom the technology is only meaningful as part of their own functioning activity system.
At the hospital, laboratory protocols are typically highly standardized and stable scripts, with specified division of labor and procedures to guarantee the quality and reliability of results.
The way the measurements are organized in the BioMag Laboratory, each researcher being responsible for and operating his or her own measurements, is atypical and may be expected to cause problems in a hospital setting.
Formulated in activity theoretical terms, we hypothesize two major contradictions in the interacting activity systems of the Brainview company and the BioMag Laboratory. For the first, within the Brainview activity system, the emerging new object of activity -clinical use of MEG at hospitals -is in contradiction with historically constructed tools and rules of an isolated producer community oriented at academic research. We assume that the second contradiction will emerge within the activity system of the BioMag Laboratory between the complex object of real patient measurement and the division of labor presupposing solo performance and solo responsibility in measurements. We suppose that this internal contradiction of the activity system may cause troubles, possibly even breakdowns and serious failures in the everyday measurement work at the laboratory.
These two contradictions internal to the activity systems necessarily lead to contradictions between the two activity systems. In other words, we assume that the culture of the Brainview and the culture of the BioMag Laboratory will conflict in various ways in interactions between their practitioners.
Measurement breakdown: Disturbances in a patient measurement
The interactional sequence analyzed here consists of three videorecorded situations at the hospital laboratory BioMag in May 1996. 1 The data on which we base our analysis is summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 .
Data of the measurement situation and problem solving event
The situations given above can be seen as a collaborative problem-solving sequence. First, the patient measurement failed. Second, an ad hoc problem identification event between the users and designers of the company took place, but the problem remained unsolved. Third, a joint test measurement was organized to investigate and resolve the problem. Interestingly enough, this joint measurement turned out to be a new form of collaboration in this particular setting, and appeared as an improvisation by the designers and the users. The sequence thus opened up a window into the critical, transitional phase of collaborative relations between the company and the hospital laboratory. Examining how the developers and the users interact in an actual situation will also facilitate the further analysis of contradictions within and between the two activity systems.
The BioMag laboratory is located at the basement level of the Helsinki University Central Hospital (HUCH) main building. In the laboratory, there are a patient preparation room, a shielded room with the MEG probe unit and an operating system room with real time data acquisition and control workstations. The offices of the laboratory manager and researchers are located in another building. The layout of the laboratory is seen in Figure 2 . The measurement setting consists of complex technological elements, combining an almost unreachable physical phenomenon and sophisticated technical solutions 2 . Measurements are performed in a magnetically shielded room where the MEG measurement unit is located. In MEG recording, the helmet-shaped bottom of the instrument with the magnetic sensor coils near its tip is brought as close as possible to the subject's head. The instrument, manufactured by the Brainview, employs 122 channels (sensors). Before the recording of the magnetic fields, the position of the subject's head relative to the instrument is determined by using head position indicator (HPI) marker coils that are attached to the subject's scalp. This is done in the preparation room before taking the subject to the shielded room. In the recording process, the positions of the marker coils with respect to anatomical landmarks are obtained. After the subject's head is positioned properly inside the helmet, the corresponding magnetic fields are recorded. All this is operated with realtime acquisition and control software.
Users operate the system via high performance workstations. Depending on the measurement protocol and the stimulus arrangements used, the measurement time will be from 30 minutes to an hour and a half. The measurement setting and an overview of the MEG system is seen below in The standard steps of using MEG for patient measurements were under development. The way of measuring patients with MEG at the BioMag laboratory may be defined as a basic research or "pre-clinical" mode. There was still no organized measurement and analysis service at the lab, and each researcher measured his or her own subjects/patients for his or her individual research project. Hence, there was no established community performing the measurements in a standardized way. Our observations at the lab revealed various kinds of sequences of actions currents within the brain. Special devices are needed to measure the magnetic fields. Sensitive (superconducting and significant variations in the participant structure and division of labor in the measurements. Still, certain basic steps -a rudimentary script -were found in every measurement (see the left column in Table 2 ). In hospital laboratories, there is a general code of reliable, quick and efficient (disturbance-free) measurements. Especially patients in poor physical condition have to be measured quickly, for safety considerations and to ensure the quality of the data.
In the analysis of the videotaped data of the failed patient measurement event, the following six disturbances were found. They are presented in relation to the basic steps of measurement in Table 2 :
Basic steps of measurement Disturbances Time
Preparing the system (e.g., tuning the channels) and the magnetically shielded room
• Before starting to prepare the patient, the channels of the MEG device had not been tuned to minimize system noise.
Preparing the subject/patient in the preparation room
• The starting of the measurement was delayed because the channels needed to be tuned in while the patient was being prepared. The problems in preparing and starting the measurement were the immediately visible disturbances seen in the flow of actions. The various troubles described in Table 2 were mainly delaying the measurement procedure. In the patient measurement, however, there is limited quantum interference device) sensors can function only at a temperature of liquid helium (-269 Celsius).
time available for performing the measurement. If the patient starts to feel pain, there is not much time to continue with the measurement. For this reason, it is essential to be able to start the registration immediately after patient preparation.
Behind the action level, however, there were more fundamental tensions related to the division of labor in the measurement. It may be argued that the seeds of disturbances were generated long before the first system failure notification entered the computer screen. Why were the channels not tuned in before the patient preparation? Why did the repair actions not work out?
Why could the users not overcome the problems? To answer these questions, we have to consider the constellation of the community in the measurement, the physical setting of the situation, and the division of tasks between the participants.
Let us consider, first, the delayed measurement resulting from having to wait for the channels to be tuned up for optimal noise performance. Before the measurement in question, nurse
Helena, the only permanent worker in the lab, had been busy preparing the magnetically shielded room for doctor Susanna's MEG measurement. When the patient arrived, Helena immediately started to prepare the patient, obviously assuming that the doctor, also arriving at the lab, would check out the MEG system and tune in the channels. This assumption was verbalized, when the nurse, while preparing the patient and almost ready to start registering the head position markers with the help of the doctor, asked about the channels. The nurse seemed to be impatient and annoyed at this delay, she glanced sideways at doctor Susanna's progress with the channels and said to the patient:
13 Nurse: Now we have to wait for a while until-
The doctor, when asked, seemed to accept that she would be in charge of the channels. On the other hand, it seemed that the division of tasks or task priorities between the participants concerning system checking and patient preparation was not clear and had not been discussed and negotiated beforehand. The practice of preparing the patient before checking the system and channels was not a well designed procedure. Had something been wrong with the system, preparing the patient would have been all for nothing. This time, the measurement could proceed, but tuning in the channels took time and the patient began experiencing pain while sitting in the shielded room.
Secondly, the measurement was delayed and finally failed because of various operating and system problems, which the key user, the doctor, was unable to solve. Why did the problems emerge and remain unsolved?
Based on an established general safety rule of hospital practice, the nurse is required to stay with the patient in the shielded room. Accordingly, when the patient had been moved to the shielded room for the MEG measurement, the nurse remained with her. The doctor closed the doors of the shielded room and began to operate on the MEG system workstation. From now on, since there is no computer screen in the shielded room, nurse Helena was neither able to see the actions of the operator nor the system messages on the computer screen. The only way to communicate was through the intercom. However, in this way, the expertise of the nurse was largely excluded from the measurement situation.
While sitting behind the closed doors, the nurse was unable or only partially able to instruct and help the doctor to use the system. The doctor was also unable to get help quickly from fellow researchers since their offices are located in another building. Because of the way the measurement was organized, collaborative problem solving and learning from each other's experience were hampered.
In activity-theoretical terms, the complex object of patient measurement was in contradiction with the division of labor, based on solo performance and solo responsibility in measurements.
This supports the historically constructed inner contradiction within the activity system of the hospital laboratory hypothesized on page 11. The patient measurement failed not because of individual mistakes or operating problems as such but largely as a consequence of the local division of labor inadequate for complex measurement of real patients.
The computer system: tool or object?
The division of labor was not the only factor constraining the patient measurement. Perhaps the most significant issue in the critical phase of the innovation process is the transformation of the artifact from an object (for designers) to a tool (for users). Would the artifact become simple and easy to use? Donald Norman (1998) argues that as technologies progress through their troubled adolescence to maturity, convenience and user experience will dominate over raw technological superiority. The mature phase of a product has to be driven by customer needs, which still is, according to Norman, a difficult transition for a technology-driven industry to understand. Criticizing current designs in information technology, Norman introduces information appliences as a solution. Ideal design buries the information technology so that the user is not even aware of its presence (Norman, 1998) .
It is interesting to look at the phase of the neuromagnetometer device in this respect. How did the device enhance -or hinder -the convenience of use? In particular, how did the computer system mediate the actions of the user when the problems emerged. In other words, we now look at how the system sofware functioned as a tool in the situation. The following interaction took place between the doctor, the nurse, and the computer system when the problems emerged. In the transcript, symbol (---) refers to inaudible speech. Key notifications of the system software appearing on the computer screen are transcribed in italics.
thought that there is something wrong with the coil, but maybe it isn't then. We have to take the patient out now. I'll tell Helena. Okay, bye. (Stands up and opens the door of the shielded room) 69 Nurse (to the patient): It was only a testing measurement this time. There was a software breakdown so many times that we were not able to do the measurement, this time. I also felt that you must get out of the room soon because of the pain in your leg. (Helping the patient out of the shielded room) 70 Nurse: There seem to be some kind of trouble in the hospital computer network now-71 Patient: I know, always some trouble-72 Doctor (to nurse Helena): This drives me crazy! Now I want them (referring to Brainview) to come here and look through this thing here! It should be noticed here that the nurse was in the shielded room with the patient. She was neither able to see the computer screen nor the operations of the doctor. The dialogue between the doctor and the nurse took place through the intercom.
When the doctor tried to measure the head position indicators (HPI) prior to registering the magnetic fields, the system reported problems with one HPI indicator (coil 1 not ok). This system notification led the users to investigate the position of the coil on the patient's head as a possible source for this problem (turns 48 to 64 in the dialogue). However, the physical setting and the different tools of the participants hindered the problem investigation. The doctor had the computer program for investigation, but not direct visual contact to the patient and the probe unit. The nurse had it the other way round. Therefore, they directed a number of questions to each other and had to wait for answers to go on. Instead of being able to direct their actions forward, they were stuck asking questions and figuring out the physical situation (turns 50 to 58). The object of activity, the measurement problem, was split into the physical object seen by the nurse and the system information seen by the doctor. At first, the system mediated the problem investigation by pointing out a problem with the HPI coil. However, the nurse did not find any physical problem with it (turn 55). At this point, the users' focus shifted away from the physical setting onto the computer system. How did the software mediate the user's actions in the situation? What information did it offer to the users to re-mediate the problem?
The operating system reported a software breakdown by warning repeatedly "I am about to kill the data acquisition client protocol" and asking "Do you really want to continue?" (turns 65 and 67). After these two notifications evidently understandable for the user, the computer provided a lot of system-related information on the screen about what it was doing at the moment (see Figure 5a ). This information, obviously necessary for the programmers in system troubleshooting purposes, was totally incomprehensible for the user. It did not help the doctor to resolve the problem and go on with the measurement. Instead, the program informed the user by stating repeatedly that "Something is wrong. Cannot do HPI" (see Figure 5b ).
Interestingly enough, the software provided on the screen also several notifications reflecting the programmer's sense on humor, for instance, "This is so wonderful" and "This won't hurt at all. How about HPI? This is your last chance" (see Figure 5c ). These sentences, meant to be funny in the first place, turned out to be arrogant for the user struggling with the program.
After the measurement was interrupted without any data received, the doctor directed her frustration to the company Brainview (line 72) as the one responsible for the problem and its resolution.
c. An example of a message box: "This won't hurt at all. How about HPI? This is your last chance!" (turn 67 in the transcript) Figure 5. Three examples of information provided by system software during the breakdown situation
The interaction between the users and the computer interestingly highlights the shifting place of the computer system in the users' activity. First, the system functioned as a tool directing the users to investigate the coil on the patient's head, i.e., by re-mediating the relation between the users and the object of activity (patient's head; problem with the coil). As the computer started to provide system-related information that was implicitly addressed to the programmers, the computer system failed to mediate between the users and the problem. Due to the ensuing software breakdown, the computer system itself became the problem and the object. This problem escalated as the doctor was informed that the whole computer network was experiencing a breakdown. Since the users were given no tools to understand and fix the software problem, they became literally tool-less and started to ask for help from the Brainview company. The following Figure 6 illustrates the various shifts between tool and object in this data excerpt. As shown in this section, the computer system did not enhance the problem investigation of the users. Instead, the computer system became a problem in itself, not allowing the users to go on smoothly with the measurement. The technology of the neuromagnetometer device was almost an antithesis to the idea of quiet, invisible, unobtrusive design advocated by Norman (1998). Would it be possible to develop the neuromagnetometer as an information appliance in which the computer system is embedded in such a way that the users are not even aware of it? As tempting as this 'ideal design' may seem, we argue that in the case of technologies such as the neuromagnetometer based on continuous co-configuration and collaborative adjustments, this model is neither a realistic nor a desirable option.
Figure 6. The shifting place of the computer system in the users' activity
The development of medical technologies for complex clinical use necessarily requires the involvement of motivated users during the process (Shaw, 1985; . Due to the variety of possible applications and adopting organizations, the users have to contribute continuously to the configuration of the technology and its application. In a sense, thus, these technologies are never finished and self-explanatory, as, for instance, a telephone or a toaster. Coconfigurational technology is typically used collectively in a particular organizational context, and its usability is constructed constantly in these settings. As one product developer of the 
Encounter between developers and users after the measurement: Multiple perspectives and re-mediation
In the physics laboratory where the MEG device originated, the researchers learned to use the system gradually with the help of the technical physicists nearby. At the hospital laboratory, however, the community and the setting were different. As our disturbance analysis indicated, the former rules did not seem to apply any longer. However, the users did not seem to question the rule which stipulated solo performance in the measurements. The breakdown of the patient measurement, the strong frustration of the users and the ensuing chance to discuss the problems with the developers shortly after the breakdown created an opportunity for a negotiation between the different perspectives of the users and the developers and thus for re-mediating the measurement activity and the division of labor within it.
After the measurement breakdown, nurse Helena expressed strong frustration and addressed her speech to the doctor, who, in turn, mainly remained silent and seemed to be confused. At the same time, the nurse expressed responsibility toward the well-being of the patient pointing out the pain that she had been experiencing. In this way, by referring to the patient condition and relating it to the reliability of the obtained data, the nurse constructed the perspective of a complex patient measurement in the situation.
1 Nurse Helena (to doctor Susanna): This is so frustrating, at times, as this thing totally just does not work out! I could hear all the time that nothing was happening, and I thought something was wrong again. 2 Nurse Helena (to Susanna): I just couldn't start shouting to you what you should do because I thought the patient would get even more nervous. I saw how miserable she was there, and she got pain in her leg, too. She also breathed with difficulty, so I thought this was not going to be a very reliable measurement either.
The product developers of the company were scheduled to arrive at the hospital laboratory in order to carry out some testing with a new system recently sold abroad. Both Helena and Susanna had thought the other one had called the company to inform the designers that they would have to do some troubleshooting with the users when they came. As a consequence, neither of them had done that. Thus, when the product developers entered the lab, the users assumed that they knew about the failed measurement. In fact, the designers did not know anything about the preceding events and frustrations in the lab. What followed then, in discussion, were sequences of competing topics, actually two overlapping conversations: the gradually emerging topic of the measurement problem between doctor Susanna and designer Timo, on the one hand; and the topic of the routine system testing and electrical installation between the two designers, on the other hand. From the doctor's point of view, the beginning of the conversation seemed to be most frustrating and awkward because she had to put forth several initiatives to get at least partial attention of the designers.
Susanna's voice gets smothered and fails while the designers continuously turn away, interrupt her speech, ignore her questions etc. The mutual topic seemed to keep fading away continuously giving way to the competing conversation between the designers.
Figure 7. The doctor explaining her measurement problems to the designers (turns 13 and 14 in the transcript)
The other designer, Pekka, made a strategic turn in the discussion by introducing a new topic concerning the fault reporting practice. He pointed out an important artifact, a system log book in which he was unable to find any notes about the problems. This turn seemingly surprised the doctor. She did not react at first and then started to ask questions indicating that she was not familiar with the system log. Thus, the troubleshooting conversation revealed a new issue, a potential shared tool, calling for shared information and for negotiated rules and practices concerning error reporting. The topic introduced by Pekka led to an attempt at re-mediating the practices and division of tasks within the user community and between the users and the designers in error reporting.
It became clear, that the way of identifying and reporting faults varied among the users and designers. The users trusted that several complaint phone calls would constitute a clear signal for troubleshooting and service. The producers expected a formal fault report to act upon. The discussion can be seen as an attempt to re-mediate the tools and rules for identifying and signaling system errors.
Pekka and Susanna used powerful discursive tools to accomplish the re-mediation: reported speech (turns 1 and 5), rhetorical questions (turn 4), and meta-talk (talk about talk) (turn 5).
These together with the log book as a new material object acted as building blocks of the remediation.
However, in the troubleshooting conversation, the perspective of system maintenance and error reporting, constructed by the designers, dominated the discussion. Interestingly enough, the nurse let the doctor talk with the designers. Neither of the users brought the actual measurement context and situation explicitly into discussion. Hence, the designers did not grasp these questions either. The users adapted to the dominant perspective of system maintenance. The perspective of complex patient measurement was not constructed in the discussion between the users and the designers, only earlier between the two users.
In the interaction, the participants failed to re-mediate the broader context and conditions of the failed measurement. The re-mediation covered the immediately retrievable issue of the setting, the error reporting practices of the laboratory. In activity-theoretical terms, the emerging object of complex patient measurement, contradictory to the solo performance (division of labor in the measurement) was not constructed in the discourse. The re-mediation was limited to the technical properties of the system: tools and rules but not the object.
A joint test session and articulation of perspectives: Object and tool
A joint test session between the designers and the users was eventually organized (see Table   1 ). We argue that the ability of actors to make metacommunicative statements, that is, to discriminate between the tool and the object, is a vital feature of an activity capable of selfreflection and expansive change (Engeström & Escalante, 1996, p. 362 ). Earlier we hypothesized that the developers may have problems in considering the clinicians not only as users of a specific technology but more broadly as practitioners for whom the technology is only meaningful as part of their own functioning activity system. The shift from being designers' object to becoming users' tool is critical for the viability of a technological artifact.
To continue the unfinished troubleshooting, the users intended to perform a real patient measurement with the designers, to "show how it really is." However, this time the doctor was not able to get a patient. A joint test session without a patient took place between the designers and the doctor. Because a measurement subject was needed, the nurse substituted for one. This way, she was again excluded from the problem investigation. The designers started to operate on the system and to perform a test measurement. The doctor mainly observed what the designers were doing. The object of complex patient measurement was not constructed in the situation. Instead, the measurement system itself served as the object of activity. Due to the missing patient, the emerging new object of activity and thus the conditions for re-mediating the activity were weakened.
Figure 8. Joint test session. The designers are operating the system while the nurse is in the shielded room for substituting a patient. The doctor is looking at the designers' work.
According to their interview accounts, the developers expected a multi-layered problem combination with some technical changes in the system unfamiliar to the users, and some bad luck with a 'risky' measurement setting requiring high capacity activities of the system. They did not explicitly mention, for instance, the user errors. They did not anticipate technical or system errors, and the testing session confirmed their assumption.
After the test result, the designers turned to instructing the users about a good measuring practice, e.g., checking the system properly before patient preparation and performing the tasks in a right temporal order. The perspective of good measurement practice, represented by the designers, dominated the discourse.
1 Designer Pekka: You should always do the reset and use a measurement system where you put it running. It will alarm about all these things immediately. 2 Doctor Susanna: Well, yes-3 Designer Pekka: At least in my mind it would be terribly frustrating, the way I feel, if you do the preparation first in the other room, and then you come here and start the system, and notice that everything is in a mess. All parties involved would find it dull. Instead, you would switch it on first to see that everything is OK, at least at the moment.
The developers also instructed the user to observe various system indicators, for instance, to enable them to formulate precise error reports. From the point of view of real patient measurements, it is easy to see how the complexity of the measurement and the suggestion to extend the observation of the system (to provide more accurate error reports), are potentially contradictory and difficult to reconcile in practice. The suggestion represented the technological perspective of the designers, implicitly presupposing that the users adopt same perspective. However, the users were not closely familiar with and interested in the specific technology itself. The additional actions suggested by the designer would increase the users' workload during the measurement and -obviously -diminish the time available for patient care. In a sense, the designers asked for the users to substitute their object, patient measurement, with the object of the measurement system.
The suggestion to increase the observation of the system revealed that the developer was not familiar with the complexities of a patient measurement and the organizing of the measurements (e.g., division of labor) at the lab. The developers had not seen everyday activity on the shop floor. The doctor's silence in the situation is also interesting. She seemed to adapt to the instructions. Although there was slight hesitation ("well, yes"; turns 2 and 5) in her talk, she did not make explicit metacommunicative statements. She did not, for instance, point out her position as a MEG researcher conducting important research, or as a clinician being in charge of patients coming from the neurology department.
This lack of metacommunicative statements in the interaction between the developers and the users implies problems in making the critical shift from object to tool, and, respectively, problems in the self-reflection and change of the activity systems. On the other hand, as our analysis in the preceding section showed, the designers are discursively perfectly capable of using meta-talk and such rhetorical tools as reported speech when it comes to re-mediating tools and rules of reporting failures. It seems clear that the emerging object, the complex patient measurement, needs to be made visible and concrete for the designers. Without such a confrontation, there is little impetus for them to expand the sphere of metacommunication and to reconstruct the entire MEG device as a tool for the users.
Conclusions
At the beginning of this paper, we suggested and briefly sketched a historical analysis in order to understand a critical phase of the innovation process, in this case, the early transition of a new medical technology from developers to users. We hypothesized a set of developmentally significant contradictions within and between the interacting activity systems of Brainview, the manufacturer of the neuromagnetometer device, and the hospital laboratory BioMag, the user organization of the device. We assumed that those contradictions will emerge and become visible in interactional situations within and between the two activity systems. We examined in detail an extended sequence of interactions that started with a breakdown situation at the hospital laboratory. Based on our analysis of the failed patient measurement and the ensuing interactions between the users and the developers of the device, we are now ready to put forward an enriched model of developmental contradictions in the implementation phase of the neuromagnetometer (MEG) device ( Figure 9 ). Within the BioMag activity system, the analysis of a failed patient measurement revealed that the division of labor, presupposing solo performance and solo responsibility in measurements, was in contradiction with the emerging new object of complex patient measurements. As even the nurse was isolated to take care of the patient in the other room, the doctor was not able to get help for her operating problems. The doctor was alone with the computer system. This division of labor, in turn, was related to the historically constructed rules of the lab assuming a "centralized research facility for several researchers and groups to come and go." This rule also stood in contradiction with the object of complex patient measurement, which would require standardized protocols and stable performance as a solid basis for customization and experimentation. This set of contradictions is depicted with the help of lightning-shaped arrows in the bottom part of the right-hand side triangle in Figure 9 .
Figure 9. Contradictions in the interacting activity systems of the Brainview and the BioMaglaboratory
Our analysis of the breakdown also uncovered another major contradiction within the BioMag activity system. The instrumentality of the measurement -the computer system in particulardid not enhance the problem solving of the user. Instead, the mastering of the complex computer system took over the main role in the situation and became temporarily the object of the users' activity, leaving the users without tools. Thus, a contradiction emerged between the object of complex patient measurement, the tools provided by the company, and the users.
This set of contradictions is depicted with the help of lightning-shaped arrows in the top part of the right-hand side triangle in Figure 9 .
Due to the historically constructed tools and rules of an isolated producer community formerly oriented at academic research, the developers of the Brainview activity system had not considered it essential to get familiar with the everyday activities at the hospital laboratory, e.g., the emerging object of complex patient measurements. The interactions between the users and the developers after the breakdown reflected two inner contradictions within the company. As the developers suggested that the users replace their object of activity, the patient measurement, with the observation of the computer system, they failed to understand the complex object of the users' activity, i.e., to discriminate between object and tool. This reveals a contradiction between the clinical use of the MEG as the developers' emerging object and their currently available tools limited to narrowly technical mastery of the MEG.
This contradiction is depicted with the help of the lightning-shaped arrow in the top part of the left-hand side triangle in Figure 9 . The developers' inability to make the switch between object and tool also reveals a related contradiction in the Brainview activity system, namely that between the developers' emerging object and their taken-for-granted division of labor and rules which assume a clear-cut separation between developers and users. This latter contradiction is depicted with the help of the lightning-shaped arrows in the bottom part of the left-hand side triangle in Figure 9 . Notice that in the Biomag activity system, the subject (users) is directly involved in the contradiction -expressing personal frustration and vocally demanding change. In the Brainview activity system this is not yet the case -the developers still did not see the situation as a crisis for them.
Based on this analysis, we argue that the anticipated outcome of the critical phase of the innovation process, the shift toward a mature customer-intelligent product driven by coconfiguration work, will require a deliberate attack to resolve the developmental contradictions within and between these two activity systems. This in turn will require major re-mediation in the activity systems. The shape and contents of this re-mediation effort are beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, it seems clear that powerful analytical tools, such as the activity-theoretical concepts and models used in this paper, are a first prerequisite of such an effort. In our ongoing intervention studies (e.g., Engeström, 1999) , activity-theoretical concepts are indeed turned into practitioners' tools for re-mediation and redesign.
Hiding the information technology upon which the MEG rests from the users, as advocated by Norman (1998) , would mean sealing it off from the contribution of the users and making it a closed black box. This solution belongs to the era of mass production, not to the era of coconfiguration which relies on users' continuous contributions to the design process during the entire life cycle of the product. In the emerging framework of co-configuration, breakdowns and failures of technological performance should not be seen as weaknesses only. They should be taken as a possibility for creating new ways to redesign the product -and the whole setting -together with the users. This activity-theoretical stance calls for expanding the notion of interface to cover the entire instrumentality of interaction and communication between the producer and the users -the contact zone between the two triangles in Figure 9 . The design of the user interface should mediate the relations between and provide common language and criteria for the user, the device, and the manufacturer.
